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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court properly denied the Motion to Vacate and 
confirmed the Award. The Court's Findings of Fact are reviewed under a "clearly 
erroneous standard;" his Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness. Buzas 
Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996). However, 
Appellant, Pacific Development, L.C. (hereinafter "Pacific") assigns no error to the 
District court, only to the Arbitrator. 
2. Whether the doctrine of "manifest disregard of the law" provides 
grounds for an appeal of an Arbitrator's award in the State of Utah. This is a matter 
of first impression. Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 
(Utah 1996). 
3. Whether a trial or appellate court may address the merits of an 
Arbitrator's decision. Cade v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 956 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 
1998) 
4. Whether the Appellee, Eric Orton dba Orton Excavation (hereinafter 
"Orton") is entitled to attorneys fees on appeal. 
1 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-31a-14: Vacation of the award by court. 
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for 
vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue 
means; 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or 
an arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights 
of any party; 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon 
sufficient cause shown, refused to hear evidence material to the 
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to the substantial 
prejudice of the rights of a party; or 
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to 
the arbitration proceeding. 
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court within 20 
days after a copy of the award is served upon the moving party, or if 
predicated upon corruption, fraud, or other undue means, within 20 days 
after the grounds are known or should have been known. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-31a-15: Modification of award by court. 
(1) Upon motion made within 20 days after a copy of the award is served 
upon the moving party, the court shall modify or correct the award if it appears 
that: 
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident 
mistake in the description of any person or property referred to in 
the award; 
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to 
them, if the award can be corrected without affecting the merits 
of the award upon the issues submitted; or 
(c) the award is imperfect as to form. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On September 20,1995, Pacific filed a complaint in the Fourth District 
Court against Orton alleging, causes of action for Wrongful Lien, Slander of Title, 
and Defamation of Character. On May 7, 1996, Orton responded by filing his 
Answer, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint, alleging causes of action for 
Quantum Meruit, Lien Foreclosure, and Failure to Obtain Contractor's Bond. 
Thereafter on May 17,1996, Pacific filed their Response to Counterclaim and Third-
Party Complaint. 
2. On June 9,1997, Pacific and Orton, through their respective counsel of 
record, executed an Agreement to Arbitrate. The arbitration was held on August 26 -
27, and September 10, 1997, after which the Arbitrator, Robert Babcock, issued an 
Interim Arbitration Award. Thereafter, Pacific filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 
Shortly thereafter, Orton filed his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. 
3. The Arbitrator, on December 24, 1997, issued his Final Arbitration 
Award. On January 2, 1998, Orton filed a Motion to Confirm Arbitrator's Award 
with the Fourth District Court, the Honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen presiding. 
Thereafter, on January 22, 1998, Pacific filed a Motion to Vacate or Modify 
Arbitration Award together with a supporting Memorandum. 
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4. On February 17,1998, the District Court held a hearing on the Motion 
to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, after which, it confirmed the Arbitrator's 
Final Arbitration Award. On February 19, 1998, the District Court signed the 
Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and Judgment, which was entered that same day. 
5. On March 23, 1998, Pacific filed Notice of Appeal, thereby appealing 
to the Utah Supreme Court from the Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and 
Judgment. Orton, on or about June 8,1998, filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. 
Plaintiffs responded by filing a Response in Opposition to Orton's Motion for 
Summary Disposition. 
6. On July 15, 1998, the District Court signed an Order Setting Aside 
Judgment Against Plaintiff Otto Belvedere. By way of Order signed on July 27, 
1998, the Utah Supreme Court "deferred ruling on appellee's motion for summary 
disposition until further consideration . . . " On August 7, 1998, the Utah Supreme 
Court poured-over the instant appeal to this Court for disposition. 
7. On October 30,1998, Plaintiff Otto Belvedere filed a Stipulated Motion 
of Appellant Otto Belvedere to Voluntarily Dismiss Otto Belvedere from Appeal. 
Thereafter, on November 3,1998, this Court, by way of Order Dismissing Appellant 
Otto Belvedere from Appeal, dismissed Otto Belvedere, solely from the instant 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant Pacific Development (Pacific) is a developer of residential real 
estate. Respondent Eric Orton is an excavation contractor. 
2. Riderwood Village is a residential subdivision in Provo, Utah, developed 
by Pacific, consisting of various plats. Eric Orton d/b/a Orton Excavation (Orton) 
was contracted to install culinary water, sanitary sewer and storm drain lines, and 
perform other excavation services, in Plats B and C. The parties entered into a 
subcontract agreement on April 20, 1994, for Plat B; the contract for Plat C was 
signed on October 10, 1994. Both agreements were "unit price" contracts. The 
October contract contained the following provision regarding fill and bedding 
materials to be imported or moved within the site: "Quantities subject to on-site 
measuring and delivery invoices and/or trucking slips, after installation." (See R. 
172, Final Arbitration Award, paragraph 3.) 
3. Work was performed by Orton for Pacific on both Plat B and Plat C. 
(See R. 172, Final Arbitration Award, paragraph 4.) 
4. A dispute arose regarding payment for Orton's work (See R. 169-172, 
Final Arbitration Award, paragraph 1-22). Orton recorded a mechanic's lien on the 
project, and later brought action to foreclose it. (See R. 166, Final Arbitration Award, 
paragraph 27; R.69-80, Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint.) 
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5. On September 20,1995, Plaintiffs, Pacific Development, L.C. (Pacific), 
and Otto Belvedere (Belvedere), through counsel, filed a Complaint in the Fourth 
District Court against Defendant Orton alleging causes of action for Wrongful Lien, 
Slander of Title, Defamation of Character {See R. 1-7, Complaint). 
6. On May 7, 1996, Orton, through counsel, filed his Answer, 
Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint {See R. 69-80, Answer, Counterclaim, and 
Third-Party Complaint). 
7. On May 17, 1996, Pacific and Belvedere, through counsel, filed their 
Response to Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint {See R.81-86, Response to 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint). 
8. On June 9,1997, Pacific and Orton, through their respective counsel of 
record, executed an Agreement to Arbitrate {See R. 145, Agreement to Arbitrate, a 
true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to the Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration 
Award; See also Finding of Fact). 
9. The Agreement to Arbitrate, as originally drafted, provided for the 
arbitration to be conducted on July 1 & 2, 1997. By verbal agreement, the hearing 
was moved to July 17 & 18. Later, it was moved, again by verbal agreement, to 
August 12 & 13. Ultimately it was moved, again by verbal agreement, to August 26 
6 
& 27, and September 10. (See R. 145, Agreement to Arbitrate; Final Arbitration 
Award, preamble.) 
10. During the arbitration held on August 26-27, 1997, and concluded on 
September 10, 1997, Plat B issues, along with issues on Plat C, were presented by 
both parties without objection by Pacific. (See R. 187-92, Interim Arbitration Award; 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion, pp. 6-9.) 
11. After receiving an award adverse to Plaintiffs on Plats B and C, Pacific' s 
counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the Arbitrator lacked 
authority to rule on Plat B issues and requesting the Arbitrator to reconsider his ruling 
in light of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, which it claimed Orton 
breached. (See R. 181-85, Motion for Reconsideration). 
12. Shortly thereafter, Orton filed his Opposition to the Motion for 
Reconsideration (See R. 177-80, Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration). 
13. On December 24,1997, the Arbitrator served upon the parties his Final 
Arbitration Award, which included, as some of the additional rulings, the following: 
25. Pacific's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The Arbitrator 
heard the arguments during the course of the proceeding that are being 
reargued by Pacific. Pacific's argument is based largely upon its 
argument that Orton had within its scope of work the obligation to 
perform the rough grading of the roadway. The Arbitrator specifically 
found that the contract did not require that work to be done by Orton. 
Orton obviously has a duty of good faith and fair dealing with Pacific. 
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The Arbitrator, however, further found that Pacific did not [sic] its 
burden of proof of its allegation that Orton wasted material in Plat C. 
26. Pacific's contention that the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to hear 
and determine issues as to Plat B is rejected. Pacific is correct in stating 
that the arbitration agreement signed on or about June 9, 1997 
represented that the issues relating to Plat B had been resolved that the 
remaining issues to be resolved at the arbitration related to Plat C. In 
actuality, the parties had not in fact reached an agreement on the Plat B 
issues. Pacific's assertion in its Motion for Reconsideration that the 
issues on Plat B had been resolved and were not to be part of the 
arbitration is not supported by the evidence and material provided to the 
Arbitrator during the course of the Arbitration. In fact, Pacific 
submitted its Pre-Arbitration Statement to the Arbitrator dated August 
25, 1997 which included as the first document in Exhibit "C" a 
document entitled "Pacific's Development's Amended Responses to 
Claims Concerning Plat B." During the course of the proceeding each 
of the parties presented evidence on the disputes relating to Plat B. The 
Parties clearly submitted those issues to the Arbitrator for resolution. 
The Award as it relates to Plat B is not modified. The Arbitrator also 
finds that the subcontract agreement required all disputes to be resolved 
by arbitration which is what the parties have now done. 
(See R. 138, Final Arbitration Award, ffi[ 25,26; Transcript of Hearing, pp. 9-10). By 
way of the Final Arbitration Award, the Arbitrator awarded a net amount to 
Defendant of $66,440.24, plus attorney fees in the amount of $17,500.00, and costs 
in the amount of $733.50 (Id. at R. 166-67, ffi[22, 23, 28,29). 
14. On January 2,1998, Orton filed a Motion to Confirm Arbitrator's Award 
with the Fourth District Court, the Honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen presiding (See 
R. 124-28, Motion to Confirm Arbitrator's Award). 
8 
15. On January 22,1998, twenty-eight (28) days after the Award was served 
upon them, Pacific filed a Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award together 
with a supporting Memorandum (See R. 135-36, Motion to Vacate or Modify 
Arbitration Award; R. 137-56, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award). 
16. On February 17,1998, the District Court held a hearing on the Motion 
to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award. (See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to 
Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, pp. 2-30). 
17. On February 19, 1998, the District Court signed the Confirmation of 
Arbitrator's Award and Judgment, which was entered that same day (See R. 230-33, 
Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and Judgment). 
18. On March 23, 1998, Pacific filed Notice of Appeal, thereby appealing 
to the Utah Supreme Court from the Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and 
Judgment (See R. 270-72, Notice of Appeal). 
19. On or about June 8, 1998, Orton, through counsel, filed a Motion for 
Summary Disposition together with a supporting Memorandum. Pacific responded 
by filing a Response in Opposition to Orton's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
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20. On July 15, 1998, the District Court signed an Order Setting Aside 
Judgment Against Plaintiff Otto Belvedere. {See R. 44-45, Order Setting Aside 
Default.) 
21. By way of Order signed on July 27, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court 
"deferred ruling on appellee's motion for summary disposition until further 
consideration..." 
22. On August 7, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court poured-over the instant 
appeal to this Court for disposition. 
23. On October 30,1998, Plaintiff Otto Belvedere filed a Stipulated Motion 
of Appellant Otto Belvedere to Voluntarily Dismiss Otto Belvedere from Appeal. 
24. Thereafter, on November 3, 1998, this Court, by way of Order 
Dismissing Appellant Otto Belvedere from Appeal, dismissed Otto Belvedere, solely, 
from the instant appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Agreement to Arbitrate provided that the arbitration was to focus on the 
disputes on Plat C, presuming that the Plat B issues had been previously resolved. 
However, as the arbitration began, it became apparent that the agreement on Plat B 
issues would not hold. The parties preceded to submit to arbitration the additional 
issues relating to Plat B. This was done by mutual consent, and without objection. 
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As a result, the Arbitrator was well within his authority to rule on the Plat B issues, 
which he did, and the trial court properly confirmed his Award. 
The Arbitrator understood the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealings, 
and gave due regard to it in his ruling. Pacific's claim that he manifestly disregarded 
the law on that point is totally unsupported by the Arbitrator's Findings of Fact and 
Award. 
Since no record was made of the proceedings, and because of current law and 
public policy favoring Alternative Dispute Resolution, the Arbitrator's Findings of 
Fact and Award are not assailable on the merits in a motion before the District Court 
or on this Appeal. 
Appeals such as this erode the value of Alternative Dispute Resolution as an 
alternative to litigation. 
Orton is entitled to its attorney's fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENTS 
L 
THE PLAT B ISSUES WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO 
THE ARBITRATOR 
The parties in this case submitted their dispute to a nonjudicial private 
arbitrator pursuant to their written agreement which is attached as Addendum A. See 
11 
Blanton v. Womancare Inc. 38 Cal.3d 396,401-402 and fii 5,212 Cal.Rptr. 151, 696 
P.2d 645 (Cal. 1985) (discussing the differences between judicial and nonjudicial 
arbitration). In cases involving private arbitration, "[t]he scope of arbitration is . . . 
a matter of agreement between the parties" {Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney 
& Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak St. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312,323,197 Cal.Rptr. 581, 673 P.2d 
251), and "[t]he powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by the 
agreement or stipulation of submission." (O 'Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Co. 
48 Cal.2d 107,110,308 P.2d 9 (1957) (quoting Pac. Fire ect. Bureau v. Bookbinders' 
Union 115 Cal.App.2d 111, 114, 251 P.2d 694 (1952).) 
Under the Utah Arbitration Act, U.C.A. Chapter 78-3la, a district court may 
vacate an arbitration award if it appears that: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an 
arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any 
party; 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon specific cause 
shown, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise 
conducted the hearing to the substantial prejudice of the rights of a 
party; or 
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the 
arbitration proceeding. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3 la-14 (1992). 
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Moreover, a court may modify an arbitration award under the Utah Arbitration 
Act if it appears that: 
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake 
in the description of any person or property referred to in the award; 
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if 
the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of the award 
upon the issues submitted; or 
(c) the award is imperfect as to form. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3la-15 (Utah). 
It appears from their brief that Pacific is seeking a review of the same two 
issues brought out previously in their summation at the conclusion of arbitration, and 
in multiple motions and other pleadings which were subsequently denied by the 
Arbitrator and the trial court judge. In essence, Pacific is seeking to have this Court, 
in its review, vacate the Arbitrator's Award and Judgment. 
A. THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS MODIFIED BY 
MUTUAL CONSENT 
The parties are required to have an agreement to arbitrate. U.C.A. 78-3 la-
14(e). The parties in this matter entered into a written arbitration agreement, although 
there is no requirement that the agreement be reduced to writing. Nothing in the 
written Agreement to Arbitrate prevented a modification, or required any 
modification to be in writing. In fact, the parties made a number of verbal 
modifications of the Agreement before the arbitration began. As can be seen from 
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Addendum A, the Agreement specified that the parties initially agreed to arbitrate the 
matter on July 1 and July 2,1997. That was changed to July 17 & 18, perhaps before 
execution of the Agreement, then changed to August 12 & 13, and then to August 26 
and 27, 1997. No new agreement was printed or executed for any of those 
modifications. 
The first issue Pacific presents is that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by 
awarding damages on Plat B, because the parties' Arbitration Agreement ostensibly 
limits his review to issues regarding Plat C. The Utah Supreme Court in the Buzas 
Baseball case, cited above, stated that: 
Generally, to find that an arbitrator has exceeded his authority, a court 
must review the submission agreement and determine whether the 
arbitrator's award covers areas not contemplated by the submission 
agreement. "It is . . . fundamental that the authority of the arbitrator 
springs from the agreement to arbitrate." 
925 P.2d at 949 (citing Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 
(3d Cir. 1972); See also Western Elec. Co. v. Communications Wkrs. of America, 450 
F.Supp. 876, 881 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The powers of an arbitrator are defined by 
agreement of the parties: the questions they submit both establishes and limits the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction. It is the reviewing court's duty [under the exceeding 
authority test] to determine whether the arbitrator has acted within that jurisdiction.") 
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Reviewing the Arbitration Agreement alone, however, is not sufficient. The 
Court must review the actual matters submitted for arbitration to determine the scope 
of the arbitrator's power. The consent of the parties as to the presentation of those 
matters actually submitted must be considered along with the original agreement to 
arbitrate. 
Absent [an] express limitation by the parties, the resulting grant 
of authority to the Arbitrator is very broad. This includes the ability of 
the Arbitrator to frame relief and is reflected in the Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association, which states in pertinent part: 
SCOPE OF AWARD - The Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief 
which the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of 
the agreement of the parties... 
(emphasis added) Hecla Min Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1980); 
See Swift Industries Inc., 466 F.2d at 1131. 
The parties may agree to expand an original arbitration proceeding. 
Buckhannon v. US West Communications, 928 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Colo. App. 1996) 
{citing Leahy v. Guaranty Nat'I Ins. Co., 907 P.2d 697, 699 (Colo. App. 1995): 
("The scope of an arbitration panel's jurisdiction depends upon the issues actually 
submitted to it for determination in the parties' proposals for arbitration.") See In re: 
Arbitration between Lynch & Three Ponds Co., 656 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1982). The 
parties may agree to submit to arbitration issues "that they were not contractually 
compelled to submit to arbitration." Executone Inf. Sys. Inc., 26 F.3d 1314,1323 (5th 
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Cir. 1994); (citing Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Union de Trabajadores de la 
Industria Gastronomica de Puerto Rico Local 610,959 F.2d 2,4 (1st Cir. 1992)); See 
also Piggly Wiggly Operators Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Operators 
Warehouse Indep. Truck Drivers Union, Local No. 1,611 F.2d 580,583-584 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
Stated otherwise, "even when an arbitration provision specifies the issues to 
be submitted to the arbitrators, the parties may agree to submit to arbitration other 
matters in dispute between them." Leahy, 907 P.2d at 699, {citing Cabus v. Dairyland 
Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 54 (Colo. App. 1982)) ("parties may agree to expand an original 
arbitration; [an] expanded agreement [gives] the arbitrator jurisdiction to determine 
all matters so submitted.") 
The Arbitration Agreement entered in this case dated June 9, 1997, states in 
pertinent part: 
Further, they acknowledge that the issues relating to the above-
referenced Plat B of Riderwood Village have been resolved, and that, 
therefore, the arbitration will focus on the remaining issues of the 
dispute, those which relate to Plat C, thereby resolving all remaining 
issues in the case. 
See Agreement to Arbitrate attached to Pacific's Brief as Addendum "A." 
While on its face this Agreement to Arbitrate seems to limit the Arbitrator's 
authority to make decisions which relate to Plat C only, this agreement to arbitrate 
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was later modified and expanded by the parties during the arbitration itself. This 
modification was allowed because nowhere in the Agreement to Arbitrate does it state 
that modifications to the agreement have to be in writing. Assuming, arguendo, that 
such a provision existed, Pacific would be estopped from arguing that it did not 
expand the original arbitration agreement because it presented evidence throughout 
the arbitration regarding Plat B. By doing so, it requested that the Arbitrator address 
the issues surrounding Plat B. 
The reason the arbitration agreement was modified at the outset of the 
arbitration was that Pacific would not hold to its earlier agreement on Plat B, which 
resolved those issues in Orton's favor. The parties, prior to signing the arbitration 
agreement, had come to an agreement regarding Plat B. The agreement was that all 
of the extras on Plat B were owing to Orton and were not to be contested. This 
agreement is demonstrated by the correspondence that preceded the agreement to 
Arbitrate. Pacific's attorney was sent a letter dated April 28, 1997, which 
documented the agreement. (See R. 213-219, April 28, 1997 correspondence from 
Richard D. Bradford to Mark Arnold.) Paragraph 3 of that letter states as follows: 
I also understand from that same conversation that Plat B was 
essentially at a break even, and the amounts owing are on Plat C. I 
understand that to mean that the signed and unsigned change orders on 
Plat B are no longer contested, and that the only contested issues relate 
to the unsigned change orders on Plat C. 
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This was clarified in a letter dated June 11,1997. (See R. 209-211, Correspondence 
dated June 11,1997, to from Richard D. Bradford to Mark Arnold.) That reiterated 
the agreement as previously stated: 
We have also established that Plat B was essentially at a break even, and 
the only real factual disputes are on Plat C. I understand that to mean 
that the signed and unsigned change orders on Plat B are no longer 
contested, and that the only contested issues relate to the unsigned 
change orders or additions on Plat C. 
This was further clarified in the second and third paragraphs of page 2 of that letter: 
The combined reconciliation of Plat B and Plat C shows that [Appellant] 
acknowledges owing Orton Excavation [Respondent] $8,916.11 prior to 
consideration of any change orders. 
At one point, Otto claimed to have overpaid Orton Excavation on Plat 
"B" by $46,771.90. However, when all of the extras on Plat "B" are 
included (signed change orders = $21,907.85; unsigned change orders 
= $24,600.67; total = $46,508.52), those come to within $263.38 of the 
$46,771.90 that Belvedere claims to have overpaid. By agreeing to 
those extras and changes on Plat "B," that eliminates any remaining 
disputes on Plat "B." 
These letters made it clear that an agreement was reached on Plat B which 
should have precluded Pacific from contesting the signed or unsigned change orders 
on Plat B, and which entitled Orton to an additional $46,508.52, effectively wiping 
out the claim that Orton was overpaid on Plat B. There is no correspondence that 
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counters or questions any portion of the understanding as stated. The Agreement to 
Arbitrate was drafted accordingly. 
At the outset of the arbitration, however, as the issues were being framed, 
Pacific claimed to have misunderstood the effect of the prior agreement that settled 
the issues on Plat B. Rather than suffer the delays that would be engendered by 
engaging in a dispute over who understood what, both parties mutually proceeded to 
present evidence on issues related to Plat B as well as Plat C. Specifically, Pacific 
wanted to contest the Plat B change orders discussed in the correspondence above. 
Throughout the three days of the arbitration, Pacific presented testimony on Plat B. 
At no time during the entire arbitration did Pacific ever voice any objection to 
presenting evidence or argument on Plat B. 
It is undisputed that the parties ultimately submitted to the Arbitrator issues 
relating to both Plat B and Plat C. See also Matteson v. Ryder System, Inc., 99 F.3d 
108 (3rd Cir. 1996). This is properly addressed in paragraph 26 of the Final 
Arbitration Award, which states as follows: 
26. Pacific's contention that the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to hear 
and determine issues as to Plat B is rejected. Pacific is correct in stating 
that the arbitration agreement signed on or about June 9, 1997 
represented that the issues relating to Plat B had been resolved that the 
remaining issues to be resolved at the arbitration related to Plat C. In 
actuality, the parties had not in fact reached an agreement on the Plat 
B issues. Pacific's assertion in it Motion for Reconsideration that the 
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issues on Plat B were resolved and were not to be part of the arbitration 
is not supported by the evidence and material presented to the 
Arbitrator during the course of the Arbitration. In fact, Pacific 
submitted its Pre-Arbitration Statement to the Arbitrator dated August 
25, 1997 which included as the first document in Exhibit "C" a 
document entitled "Pacific Development's Amended Responses to 
Claims Concerning Plat B". During the course of the proceeding each 
of the parties presented evidence on the disputes relating to Plat B. The 
Parties clearly submitted those issues to the Arbitrator for resolution. 
The Award as it relates to Plat B is not modified... 
(emphasis added.) 
Numerous courts, including the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals have followed 
the Appellees' position holding that: 
If the parties go beyond their promise to arbitrate and actually submit an 
issue to the arbitrator, we look both to the contract and to the scope of 
the submissions to the arbitrator to determine the arbitrator's authority. 
Executonelnf Systems, Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d at 1314 (citing Piggly Wiggly, 611 F.2d 
at 584); see also United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7R v. 
Safeway Stores., Inc., 889 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir. 1989); Sun Ship Inc. v. Matson 
Navig. Co., 785 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986). 
The inevitable conclusion is that a party may not submit an issue to arbitration 
and then, as Pacific is doing here, challenge the authority of the Arbitrator to act on 
the very issue when it obtains an unfavorable result. Wages v. Smith Barney Harris 
Upham & Co., 937 P.2d 715, 720 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1997). See Ficek v. Southern 
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Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655,657 (9th Cir. 1964), cert, denied 380 U.S. 988,85 S.Ct. 1362, 
14 L.Ed.2d 280 (1965). Finally, code sections 78-31a-14 and 78-31a-15 Utah Code 
Annotated, which govern the vacation or modification of an arbitration award do not 
allow a court to either modify or vacate an award simply because the party disagrees 
with the Arbitrator's award on the merits. 
B. THE APPELLANTS DID NOT OBJECT DURING THE 
PROCEEDING. 
Pacific never objected to the evidence being submitted by either party 
regarding Plat B during the arbitration, and in fact requested the opportunity to 
submit. Appellant is therefore estopped from arguing that the Arbitrator exceeded his 
authority by making a ruling on the issues relating to Plat B and awarding damages 
on it. 
A party waives the right to dispute the matter by participating in the arbitration 
without objection. Russell v. World Famous, Inc., 767 P.2d 456 (Or. App. 1989) 
(citing Mendelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 590 P.2d 726 (Or. 1979)). This 
same argument was also followed by the Supreme Court of Alaska in Ebasco 
Constructors, Inc. v. Ahtna, 932 P.2d 1312,1317 (Alaska 1997) where the court held 
that the party to an arbitration waived its right to argue to the court that the arbitrator 
should not have considered the new argument for recovery presented for the first time 
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on the initial day of arbitration because the party's counsel had failed to make an 
objection before the arbitrator concerning the introduction of the new matter. See 
Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. v. Strube Construction Co., 715 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1986) 
(school district which had chosen to not object to the arbitrability of the dispute but 
chose instead to participate in hopes of a favorable result, was foreclosed from raising 
the issue of arbitrability on a motion to confirm or vacate the award.); Five Keys Inc. 
v. Pizza Inn, Inc., 653 P.2d 870 (N.M. 1982) (court held that although the arbitration 
award was untimely made, the Plaintiffs had waived their right to object by waiting 
until after the award was made to complain of its untimeliness. "A party should not 
be permitted to wait and see whether the arbitrator will rule in his or her favor before 
asserting his or her objection."); Ash Apartments v. Martinez, 656 P.2d 708 (Colo. 
App. 1982) (Plaintiffs had by their own conduct waived their right to object to the 
timeliness of the award until after the announcement of the result which was 
unfavorable to them.); Alaska State Hous. v. Riley Pleas Inc., 586 P.2d 1244 (Alaska 
1978) (holding that, where State Housing Authority did not raise objection to alleged 
bias of arbitrator at arbitration hearing, it waived its right to object, even though it 
believed that challenge would be ineffective and would only serve to worsen its 
chances of obtaining a favorable result). 
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Pacific admits that it made no objections regarding the Appellee's submission 
of evidence on Plat B, (See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Vacate, pp.6-9) and 
in fact brought in their own evidence regarding Plat B. (See Award of Arbitration, 
para. 25) Having done so, Pacific is now barred from raising the issues on appeal, or 
arguing that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by ruling on Plat B issues. 
C. THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT REQUIRED ALL 
DISPUTES TO BE SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION, 
WHICH THE PARTIES DID. 
The final sentence of paragraph 26 of the Final Arbitration Award states as 
follows: 
. . . The Arbitrator also finds that the subcontract agreement required all 
disputes to be resolved by arbitration which is what the parties have now 
done. 
Therefore, under a binary analysis, either the Plat B issues were resolved by the 
prior agreements or they were not. If they were, then justice and fairness would 
require that Pacific be held to that. As a result, Orton would get an additional 
$20,000.00, and poetic justice. If they were not so resolved, then the subcontract 
agreement required them to be submitted to arbitration, which they were, as 
evidenced by the preceding argument. 
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II. 
THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT MANIFESTLY DISREGARD THE LAW 
A party seeking to vacate or modify an arbitration award must prove that one 
of the grounds specified in the statutes governing the vacating or modification of 
arbitration awards exists. 
It appears that Pacific's second argument is that the Arbitrator disregarded well 
established contract law concerning the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
and by doing that, exceeded his authority under Section 78-3 la-14(c). 
"Manifest disregard of the law" is a "judicially-created doctrine stemming 
from the 'exceeding authority' statutory ground." Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 951; 
see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37, 74 S.Ct. 182, 187, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953) 
("[T]he interpretations of the law by the arbitrators[,] in contrast to manifest 
disregard[,] are not subject... to judicial review for error . ..) (emphasis added); 
Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 21A F.2d 805, 
808 (2d Cir. 1960). As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Buzas, "[i]f arbitrators 
manifestly disregard the law in making their award, they can be said to have exceeded 
their authority," but "manifest disregard is much more than mere error as to the law." 
Id. at 951. The Second Circuit of Appeals in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
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Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (1986) has stated in reference to the "manifest 
disregard" standard: 
Although the bounds of this grounds have never been defined, it clearly 
means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law. The 
error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly 
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. 
Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that the arbitrator appreciates the 
existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or 
pay no attention to it. 
Id. at 933 (citations omitted). 
In the present case, there is no record upon which Pacific can establish that the 
Arbitrator, though he knew of the contract law concerning the implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, nevertheless blatantly disregarded it. The alleged error is not 
apparent on its face. And nowhere in all the motions and other pleadings that Pacific 
has filed has it shown evidence that the Arbitrator knew and correctly stated the law 
but chose to ignore it in fashioning his award. The Arbitrator heard all the evidence 
and simply made his decision on the facts. It appears that Pacific's claim regarding 
the Arbitrator's "disregard of the law" amounts to nothing more than their 
"disagreement" with the Arbitrator regarding the issue of whether Orton did or did 
not utilize too much material in the course of providing services on Plat C. There is 
no evidence presented by Pacific which meet the "manifestly disregarded" burden 
and thus the statutory ground of exceeding authority cannot be found in our case. 
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In addition, even if the Arbitrator had made an error in his application of the 
law or interpretation of the law, that is still not grounds for a reversal of the 
Arbitrator's decision. Eljer Mfg Inc. v. Kowin Development Corp., 14 F.3d 1250 (7th 
Cir. 1994); see Bowles Financial Group Inc., v. Stifel, Nicolaus, & Co. Inc., 22 F.3d 
1010 (10th Cir. 1994) (errors in arbitrator's interpretation of law or findings of fact 
do not merit reversal under the de novo standard of review). 
Moreover, it should be noted that, in footnote 8 of the Buzas Baseball opinion 
cited in this section, the Supreme Court held that, while it analyzed the "manifest 
disregard of the law" ground because it was raised by the Appellant there and relied 
upon by the trial court below, that the Court reserved the issue of whether that 
ground was even recognized in Utah. Orton can find no other Utah cases that have 
dealt with the issue of manifest disregard since the Buzas decision and thus, under the 
present statute, the "manifest disregard of the law" argument is not even adopted in 
Utah. 
This court should also be persuaded by the numerous other jurisdictions which 
have not allowed the vacation of the arbitrator's decision based on the "manifest 
disregard of the law" argument. It is helpful, and very persuasive, to look to the 
decisions of other states, and view their interpretation of identical statutory language. 
SeeLoomis, Inc. v. Cueahy, 656 P.2d 1359 (Idaho 1982). 
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For instance some courts have held that "[b]y voluntarily agreeing to arbitrate, 
the parties thereby assumed all the hazards of the arbitration process, including the 
risk that the arbitrators may make mistakes in the application of law and in their 
findings of fact." Gadd v. Kelley, 667 P.2d 251 (Haw. 1983) {quoting Mars 
Constructors, Inc. v. Tropical Enterprises Ltd., 460 P.2d 317, 319-20 (Haw. 1969)). 
The simple fact that "an arbitrator may err in applying the law, finding facts, or 
construing the contract, or enters an award that is contrary to the evidence adduced, 
is insufficient grounds for judicial review." Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Makahuena 
Corp., 675 P.2d 760, 766 (Haw. 1983) {quoting University of Hawaii Professional 
Assembly ex rel Daeufer, 659 P.2d 720, 726-28 (Haw. 1983)) (emphasis added). 
The Kansas Supreme Court has also held that "[n]othing in the award relating 
to the merits of the controversy, even though incorrectly decided, is grounds for 
setting aside the award in the absence of fraud, misconduct, or other valid 
objections." Jackson Irak Group v. Mid States Port A, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (Kan. 
1988). (emphasis added). Pacific has failed to show fraud, misconduct or other valid 
objections which would allow a modification or vacation of the award. 
The Utah Federal District Court, in analyzing the "manifest disregard of the 
law argument," characterized the term to be "willful inattentiveness to the governing 
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law." Jeppsen v. Piper, Jajfray & Hopwood, Inc. 879 F.Supp. 1130 (D. Utah 1995) 
{citing Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
A. THE APPELLANT DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF 
PROOF 
Pacific argues "manifest disregard of the law," but the argument quickly 
evaporates in light of the fact that the facts do not support any finding that the duty 
of good faith and fair dealings was breached. The Arbitrator heard the arguments 
regarding this issue, but he simply found the facts to be against Pacific, stating,"... 
Pacific did not meet its burden of proof of its allegation that Orton wasted material 
in Plat C." Paragraph 26, Final Arbitration Award. This is more fully elucidated in 
paragraph 22: 
. . . The Arbitrator does not find that the evidence supports a finding that 
Orton wasted material. There was evidence presented by Pacific that 
more material was used in Plat C than maybe Pacific thought should 
have been used. Pacific, however, did not meet its burden on that issue. 
The computation of Fred Clark were general in nature omitting some 
lengths of pipe installation, assumed that Orton was responsible to cut 
the road for rough grading, etc. 
(emphasis added.) 
From these Findings, we clearly see that Pacific did not meet its burden of 
proof on its claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Without the 
factual basis, the entire argument on the law is moot. There is no amount of judicial 
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or appellate review that can validate Pacific's argument, since the facts do not fit. 
This really is the death knell of Pacific's "manifest disregard of the law" argument. 
B. THE AWARD RECOGNIZES AND APPLIES THE 
PRINCIPLE OF LAW 
The Appellants cannot show that the Arbitrator's decision involved any wilful 
inattentiveness to the governing law. In fact, in paragraph 25 of the Final Arbitration 
Award, the Arbitrator demonstrates that he recognized and understood the principle, 
as well as Pacific's argument, when he stated, " . . . Orton obviously has a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing with Pacific." However, the Arbitrator went on to find 
that Pacific simply did not meet its burden of proof as stated above. Therefore, it is 
clear that there was no manifest disregard of the law. The Arbitrator understood it 
and applied it properly to the facts of the case. 
C. THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT IMPOSE A NEW TERM OF 
THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT — THE PARTIES 
INCLUDED IT THEMSELVES. 
Pacific claims that the Arbitrator not only manifested disregard for the law, but 
also implied a new term in the unit contract by requiring that Pacific hire an 
employee, such as an engineer, to monitor the fill material used by Orton. While 
Pacific does not claim this to be a "manifest disregard of the law," it appears to assign 
some error to the Arbitrator in this matter. However, Pacific seems to overlook the 
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fact that, the contract on Plat C, dated October 10, 1994, contained the following 
language in the addendum: "Quantities subject to on-site measuring and delivery 
invoices and/or trucking slips, after installation." (Final Arbitration Award, 
paragraph 3.) Thus we see that the requirement of on-site monitoring was not a term 
imposed by the Arbitrator, but was a term of the subcontract agreement entered into 
by the parties on Plat C. Pacific's failure to provide such monitoring was a result of 
the neglect of its own contractual duty. No error can be assigned to the Arbitrator. 
III. 
NEITHER CURRENT LAW NOR PUBLIC POLICY ALLOW THE 
APPELLATE COURTS TO VACATE OR MODIFY THE ARBITRATOR'S 
DECISION ON THE MERITS 
There are a number of reasons that the Arbitrator's decision cannot be assailed 
on its merits, aside from the fact that, on its merits, it is correct. 
It was Orton's position and understanding when he submitted the case to 
arbitration that the parties were going to commit themselves to abide by the decision 
of the Arbitrator. The benefits of arbitration include, among others, speedier 
resolution of disputes, avoidance of juries, participation in the selection of the 
decision maker, less formality and expense, and more confidentiality. Orton expected 
that the dispute would be resolved without further contact with the courts, except for 
a perfunctory confirmation of the award if there arose a need for judicial enforcement. 
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It is these advantages, commonly touted by the Courts, and, in large part, the desire 
to avoid the prospect of delays and costs of judicial trials and appeals, that encourage 
litigants to enter into arbitration. (See Andreas F. Lowenfield, Can Arbitration 
Coexist with Judicial Review. A Critique ofLaPine v. Kyocera Sept. 1998 at 1., 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ; LaPine v. Kyocera, 909 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
Judicial review of arbitration proceedings, however, does not support the 
advantages usually contemplated by those who may choose arbitration as an effective 
form of alternative dispute resolution. Id. In fact, it goes against the public policy 
which supports those aspects of arbitration which are beneficial to the parties as well 
as to the courts whose responsibilities are eased. Id. 
Appellate review of the merits of this case will inevitably prolong (and in fact 
already has prolonged) the process of arbitration, negating the expeditiousness that 
was once one of the most important advantages to these parties of engaging in 
arbitration. Orton's position is well supported in case law. The United States District 
Court, in the Northern Division of California stated in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 
10Cal.Rptr.2dl83(1992): 
Indeed, the very essence of the term arbitration connotes a binding 
award. (Blanton v. Womancare Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p.402, 212 
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Cal.Rptr. 151, 696 P.2d 645 (1985), citing Domke on Commercial 
Arbitration (rev. ed. 1984) p.l.) 
* * * * 
As a consequence, arbitration awards are generally immune from 
judicial review. Parties who stipulate in an agreement that controversies 
that may arise out of it shall be settled by arbitration, may expect not 
only to reap the advantages that flow from the use of that nontechnical, 
summary procedure, but also to find themselves bound by an award 
reached by paths neither marked nor traceable and not subject to judicial 
review. (Case v. Alperson (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 757, 759, 5 Cal.Rptr. 
635 . . .) (Nogueiro v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals 203 Cal.App.3d 
1192, 1195, 250 Cal.Rptr. 478 (1988).) 
Id. at 187-88 
Based on the law and these enumerated facts, this Court should not allow 
Pacific, as a disappointed party, to bring its dispute into the Court by the back door, 
claiming an entitlement to appellate review of the Arbitrator's decision. Allowing 
appellate review of final decision by the Arbitrator undermines the very essence of 
alternative dispute resolution. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 
704 (7th Cir. 1994) ; United Paperworkers Intern. Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 
36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 369, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); Chicago Typographical Union v. 
Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-06 (7th Cir. 1991); Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 768 F.2d 914, 921 
(7th Cir. 1985). 
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The delays in this case have eroded the motivation of the parties to arbitrate 
matters instead of litigating the matters in court. This case was originally scheduled 
to be arbitrated during the summer of 1996. Pacific obtained a series of 
postponements, and the arbitration hearing was finally held at the end of August, with 
a final hearing date of September 10, 1997. The Interim Arbitration Award was 
issued on November 7, 1997. Pacific objected to the award of attorneys fees and 
moved for reconsideration of the Award on the same two grounds discussed in 
Pacific's Brief. The Arbitrator addressed these issues in his final Arbitration Award 
on December 24,1997. After the Final Award was issued, Pacific filed, on January 
22,1997, a Motion to Vacate or Modify the Arbitration Award, again addressing only 
the same two issues that are raised in this Appeal. That Motion was subsequently 
denied and the Arbitrator's decision was confirmed by the trial court. Subsequently, 
this appeal was taken, and the final decision cannot be expected much before the 
three-year mark after first agreeing to arbitrate. 
The expectation of finality strongly influences the parties' choice of an arbitral 
forum over a judicial on. The arbitrator's decision should be the end, not the 
beginning, of the dispute. {See Feldman, Arbitration Modernized — The New 
California Arbitration Act 34 So.Cal.L.Rev. 413, 414, fh.l 1 (1961)) Expanding the 
availability of judicial review of such decisions would tend to deprive the parties to 
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the arbitration agreement of the very advantages the process is intended to produce. 
(Victoria v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.3d at 751, 222 Cal.Rptr. 1,710 P.2d 833 
(Cal. 1985) [dis. opn. of Lucas, J.]; see generally, Judicial Deference, supra, 23 
UCLAL.Revatp. 949.) 
[conclusiveness is expected; an essence of the arbitration process is that 
an arbitral award shall put the dispute to rest. (Comment, Judicial 
Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power 
and Finality 23 UCLA L.Rev 948-949 (1976).) It has thus been 
observed that, the parties [to an arbitration] can take a measure of 
comfort in knowing that the arbitrator's award will almost certainly 
mean an end to the dispute. (Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration §6:10, 
p. 140.(1987)) 
A. THE APPELLATE COURT REVIEWS ONLY THE 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, NOT THE AWARD 
OF THE ARBITRATOR 
Pacific is requesting a review of the underlying merits of the arbitration which 
were decided against it. In doing so, it is asking the Court of Appeals to review the 
decision of the Arbitrator, which it has no authority to do, under either statutory or 
case law. It is this Court's duty to only review the trial court's decision and not the 
Arbitrator's decision. 
The trial court, faced with a motion for modification or vacatur, is limited to 
determining whether any of the very limited grounds exist. 
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The standard of review for a Utah trial court reviewing an arbitration award is 
an extremely narrow and limited one. See Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, 
Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996). "The [trial] court should give considerable leeway 
to the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow 
circumstances." Id. citing First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), 
115 S.Ct. 1920,131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); seeJeppsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, 
Inc., 879 F. Supp 1130 (D. Utah 1985) (quoting Litvak Packing Co. v. United Food 
& Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7,886 F.2d 275,276 (10th Cir. 1989)) (the 
standard of review for an arbitrator award "is among the narrowest known to the 
law.") These narrow and limited circumstances are outlined at sections 78-3la-14 
and 78-3 la-15 of the Utah Code Annotated. A trial court faced with a motion to 
vacate or modify an arbitration award is limited to determining whether any of the 
very limited grounds for modification or vacatur exist. Id. 
It is very clear though in both State and Federal courts that the trial court may 
not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator who has reviewed all of the 
evidence, nor may it modify or vacate an award just because it disagrees with the 
arbitrator's assessment. Id. at 948; see United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco 
Inc., 484 U.S. 29,38 ,108 S.Ct. 364-370-71,98 L.Ed 286 (1987); see also Robinson 
& Wells P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1983); Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 
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P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1923) (Ordinarily a court has no authority to review the action 
of arbitrators to correct errors or to substitute its conclusion for that of the arbitrator); 
Bivans v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 174 P. 1126 (Utah 1980) ("[A]wards 
will not be disturbed on account of irregularities or informalities, or because the court 
does not agree with the award..."). 
Perhaps the most important reason, though, is that trial courts: 
. . . do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as 
an appellee court does in reviewing the decisions of lower courts...if the 
[trial] courts were free to intervene on these grounds, the speedy 
resolution of grievances by private mechanisms would be greatly 
undermined." Buzas, 925 P.2d at 948 quotingMisco, 484 U.S. at 38. 
This principle, that a trial court must give deference to the arbitrator's decision 
and that review is extremely limited, is also supported by the federal court system. 
The 10th Circuit has stated: 
Once an arbitration award is entered, the finality that [trial] courts 
should afford the arbitration process weighs heavily in favor of the 
award, and [trial] courts must exercise great caution when asked to set 
aside an award. Because a primary purpose behind arbitration 
agreements is to avoid the expense and delay of court proceedings, it is 
well settled that judicial review of an arbitration award is very narrowly 
limited. 
Foster v. Turly, 808 F.2d 38,42 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 
This same line of reasoning was applied by the federal court in Colorado, 
where the District Court in CheckRite of San Jose, Inc. v. CheckRite, Ltd., 640 
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F.Supp. 234 (D. Colo. 1986) stated reasons behind not setting aside an arbitrator's 
award, and instead giving deference to that award: 
Judicial review of an award following properly conducted arbitration 
proceedings is extremely narrow, and an arbitrator's award will not be 
set aside unless it fails to "draw its essence from the collector's 
bargaining agreement." Once an arbitration award is entered, the finality 
of arbitration weighs heavily in its favor and cannot be upset except 
under exceptional circumstances. Parties who agreed to submit matters 
to arbitration are "presumed to agree that everything, both as to law and 
fact, necessary to render an ultimate decision, is included in the 
authority of the arbitrator." Courts are expected to and justified in 
exercising caution when asked to vacate an arbitration award, which is 
the product of the theoretically informal, speedy and inexpensive 
process of arbitration, freely chosen by the parties. Further when a party 
attacks the validity of such an award, the party has the burden of 
sustaining such an attack. The policy behind upholding final arbitration 
awards is the settlement of disputes amicably and quickly without 
extensive judicial intervention; speed and inexpensiveness are essential 
qualities of the arbitration process. In order to preserve these qualities 
and thereby retain the effectiveness of the arbitral system, it is essential 
that the federal courts recognize that the arbitrator is in the best position 
to make decisions relating to and affecting the parties to the arbitration, 
and to defer to the arbitrator[']s judgment, absent abuse of his power. 
Id. at 236 (citations omitted). 
The sense of Pacific's brief is that it is not, in fact, asking that the trial court's 
decision be reviewed, but instead that the Arbitrator's decision be reviewed. Pacific 
urges that the Arbitrator came to the wrong conclusion, therefore the trial court's 
refusal to vacate it should be reversed. Yet there is no error assigned to the trial 
court in all of Pacific's brief. 
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The trial court was correct in its review of Pacific's Motion to Vacate or 
Modify Arbitration Award as evidenced by the transcript of the hearing. See 
Transcript of the Hearing on Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award pp. 2-31. 
Its review was narrow and followed the statutory requirements. 
B. NEITHER THE DISTRICT COURT NOR THE 
APPELLATE COURT CAN REACH THE MERITS 
The review by a District Court Judge of an Arbitration Award is not what is 
contemplated in an appellate review. The Trial Court does not sit as an appellate 
court, and cannot modify or vacate the award on the merits. It cannot even reconsider 
the merits of the arbitration. This was alluded to in a recent Utah case, Case v. Zions 
First Nat'I Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, at 1081: 
. . . the only step left in the process was either confirmation or vacation 
of the award by the trial court which did not involve reconsideration of 
the merits of arbitration award . . . 
Though not central to the holdings of the case, this statement clearly 
demonstrates the underlying assumption that district courts are not to reach the merits 
of an Arbitrator's decision. 
When a trial court considers a motion to vacate or modify an arbitrator's award, 
it reviews the process o/the arbitration and not the merits of the arbitration. This was 
contemplated by our legislature in drafting the statute. That statute clearly states: 
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Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for 
vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an 
arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any 
party; 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon specific cause 
shown, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise 
conducted the hearing to the substantial prejudice of the rights of a 
party; or 
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the 
arbitration proceeding. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3la-14. 
Moreover, a court may modify an arbitration award under the Utah Arbitration 
Act if it appears that: 
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake 
in the description of any person or property referred to in the award; 
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if 
the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of the award 
upon the issues submitted; or 
(c) the award is imperfect as to form. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3 la-15. 
All of these grounds seem to deal with the fairness of the arbitration process, 
or assuring the process be free of "corruption, fraud or other undue means;" that the 
arbitrator is neutral or impartial, and not "guilty of misconduct;" that the arbitrator 
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grant a postponement upon timely notice and under appropriate circumstances; that 
the arbitration be by voluntary agreement; that there exists no miscalculation or 
clerical error. Under these circumstances, the statutes allow the trial courts to review 
the process of the arbitration but in no way do they allow the trial court to review the 
underlying Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. The trial court is not an 
appellate court for arbitrators. It merely safeguards the integrity of the process. 
C. THE PARTIES AGREED TO BE BOUND BY THE 
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD 
Finally, it should also be noted that the parties' Agreement to Arbitrate 
contains a provision that "[t]he parties agree that they will abide by the Award 
rendered by the Arbitrator..." . (See Addendum "A.") 
This is an expression of the parties' intent to waive the right to appeal the 
Arbitrator's decision, and effectively precludes this appeal on the merits, despite what 
the Appellant perceives as an unfavorable result. 
IV. 
THE APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Orton prevailed below, and was awarded attorneys fees, including after-
accruing attorneys fees as may be shown by affidavit. Having prevailed below, 
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Appellee is entitled to attorneys fees on appeal. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9 (Utah 
App. 1994); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
Pacific is really somewhat misguided in this appeal. It raises two points, 
attacking the Arbitrator's Award. However, the only actions this Court can review 
are those of the Trial Court, and the Trial Court committed no error. 
The Appellant did not have the ammunition to convince the Trial Court to 
vacate or modify the Award, so all the Court could do was to confirm it, which he 
did. Now the identical arguments, which were unsuccessful there, are paraded before 
this Court, dressed up a bit in their finery. This Court can do no more with them than 
the Trial Court could—in fact, even less. This Court can do nothing to change the 
Arbitrator's Award. The Appellant's dissatisfaction with the result does not translate 
into any action this Court can take to change it. The Appellant assigns error to the 
Arbitrator, and assigns none to the Trial Court; there was in fact no error by either. 
Yet somehow the Appellant requests that the Trial Court be reversed because of a 
claim that the Arbitrator did not "get it right." That does not make a lot of sense. 
Thus there seems to be something vaguely misguided about this appeal. 
Although this appeal should never reach the merits of the Arbitrator's Award, 
it should not hurt to point out that the Arbitrator was right, after all. 
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First, he ruled on the issues that were submitted to him. Pacific admitted that 
no objection was made to arbitrating all of the disputes, including Plat B, until after 
the Award was handed down. Far from objecting during the arbitration, Pacific 
submitted extensive evidence and argument of its own on Plat B issues. Pacific may 
not benefit from a situation it set up, as though a trap. 
On the second point, the claim of "manifest disregard of the law," Pacific lost 
on the facts. It did not meet its burden of proof. Without the facts to support the 
legal argument, it is dead on arrival with no hope of a resurrection. The Arbitrator 
is a bright fellow. He understood the law on good faith and fair dealings. The facts 
of the case simply did not support its application. 
With rigor mortis having set in on the two arguments made by Pacific, we step 
back to look at the big picture on Alternative Dispute Resolution. This Court can 
advance the cause of binding arbitration by taking the opportunity, in this case, to 
protect others who opt for arbitration they should be spared the agony of undue delay 
and the expense of appeal. It should be made clear that there is no review of the 
merits of an arbitration award, either before a trial court or before an appellate court. 
The court system can still safeguard the integrity of the process of arbitration, while 
refusing to hear appeals on the merits of an award. One of the features of arbitration 
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should be that it nearly always means an end to the dispute. This situation best serves 
the public and the judicial system. 
The lower Court's ruling should be affirmed or, in the alternative, the Motion 
for Summary Disposition should now be granted and attorneys fees and costs should 
be awarded to Orton. 
DATED this day of January, 
Attorneys for Eric Orton dba Orton Excavation 
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BRADFORD, BRADY & JOHNSON, L.C. 
389 North Universuy Avenue 
P.O. Box432 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Richard D. Bradford Telephone: (801) 374-6272 
M. James Brady Facsimile: (801) 374-6282 
S. Austin Johnson 
James E. Bean 
April 28, 1997 
Mark E. Arnold 
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 404 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: Pacific Development v. Eric Orton 
Dear Mark: 
It is unfortunate that our schedules did not permit our meeting to occur as scheduled last 
Wednesday. However, in anticipation of a meeting in the near future, I am writing to clarify my 
current understanding as to various issues, to render an accounting as to the amounts owed, and to 
provide you with our settlement position. 
According to our discussions a week ago last Wednesday, the Plaintiffs are dropping their 
claims relating to the defamation causes of action. 
I also understand from that same conversation that Plat B was essentially at a break even, and 
the amounts owing are on Plat C. I understand that to mean that the signed and unsigned change 
orders on Plat B are no longer contested, and that the only contested issues relate to the unsigned 
change orders on Plat C. 
We also agreed, on the issue of the change orders, that as stated by Otto Belvedere in his 
deposition, any work ordered or authorized by Otto, John, or anyone else in authority on the project, 
would be paid regardless of whether a change order was prepared or signed. 
We provided to you earlier an explanation regarding the thirteen (13) change orders on Plat 
C, and you responded with Mr. Belvedere's corresponding explanations. 
In preparation for our meeting on Wednesday, my paralegal and I did a more thorough review 
of the accounting. A summary of the accounting follows. Backup documentation is available for 
each of these items. 
Mark E. Arnold 
April 28, 1997 
Page 2 
To insure fairness, and to simplify the accounting as much as possible, I have taken as the 
starting point Otto Belvedere's own accounting reconciliations. According to Dave Schiess, Otto's 
Accountant, his express instructions were to prepare these reconciliations on the base contract only 
and without regard to any changes, extras, or additions. 
The combined reconciliation of Plat B and Plat C shows that Otto acknowledges owing Orton 
Excavation $8,916.11 prior to consideration of the change orders. 
The signed and unsigned change orders on Plat B total 546,508.52. The change orders from 
Plat C add an additional 565,263.98. This brings the total so far to 5120,688.61. 
In the process of reviewing the accounting, we also discovered a number of items that were 
included in the Mountainland credit against Orton Excavation which were improperly credited. 
They were either not used on the job at all, or were not used in connection with Orton Excavation's 
portion of the contract. These are further detailed in the attached spread sheet, and I have backup 
documentation regarding each of these credits that we claim have been improperly taken. You may 
want to review each of those individually when we meet. This adds an additional 532,467.74. 
We also noted that the amounts paid to Mountainland included finance charges. Since the 
agreement was that Pacific Development would pay the Mountainland invoices directly, any delay 
in paying those bills, resulting in service charges, should not be charged against Orton Excavation. 
We therefore add those back in the amount of 59.922.50. 
This brings us to a total principal balance, prior to the addition of interest or attorney's fees 
to 5163,078.85. 
As to the calculation of interest, it is a very complex matter to calculate the interest on each 
invoice from the due date forward. It is further complicated by the timing of the sequence of all the 
payments. Therefore, in order to simplify the calculation of interest and to give Pacific Development 
a break. I have calculated interest at the legal rate, beginning thirty (30) days after completion of all 
work. This figure therefore includes no interest for the first year and a half of the project. 
Calculating interest at the legal rate of 10%, the interest amounts to 530,515.85 
Attorney fees, as provided by statute as well as by contract, together with costs to date, 
amounts to 521,652.46. 
Any settlement figures we might have discussed previously would not have taken into 
account the excludable amounts paid to Mountainland. 
There are other damages which my client considers to be significant, including lost 
opportunity costs, loss of equity, and loss of utility in his equipment when it was repossessed. Eric 
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Mark E. Arnold 
April 28, 1997 
Page 3 
claims that his inability to make his equipment payments was directly related to Mr. Belvedere's 
failure to make payments as promised. 
Notwithstanding these additional claims, I believe that you and I both are of the opinion that 
this case should be setded to our clients' mutual advantage. I have advised my clients that in order 
to achieve a settiement, they cannot expect to receive all of their money with all of their interest and 
attorney's fees. I have recommended that they make an offer which involves a very significant 
discount to motivate Pacific Development to come to settlement quickly. 
We do not have a lot of time at this juncture to get this case settled. I generally do not like 
"take it or leave it" offers, but I have encouraged my clients to make their best offer first. We need 
to know now if this case is going to settle before we put significant additional time into preparation 
for arbitration or litigation. 
Accordingly. I am authorized to offer the following settlement. Orton Excavation will accept 
the sum of SI50,000.00 as one lump sum cash payment, in full settlement of all claims and for 
release of all liens. This offer is open until May 9,1997, at which time it is automatically withdrawn 
if not accepted. 
This figure discounts all of the interest, all of the attorney's fees and costs, and gives a 
significant discount for disputed items on the change orders and disallowed invoices. 
Please do not submit a counter offer for a lesser amount unless Mr. Belvedere can show a 
compelling reason to revise his accounting, and can back it up with documentation, or a similarly 
compelling reason, with backup documentation, to contest the disallowed Mountainland charges. 
All of the backup documentation is in Mr. Belvedere's files, and our accounting is simply 
taken from those documents. However, if you wish to view my documents and summaries for 
convenience, I will make myself available whenever possible for that review. 
Please discuss this settlement proposal and the rationale behind it at your earliest opportunity. 
I hope to hear from you well before the deadline. 
RDB:dvc 
cc: Eric Orton 
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MASTER ACCOUNTING 
Based on Belvedere's Plats B & C Reconciliation and 
Orton's Signed and Unsigned Change Orders for Plats B & C 
Belvedere's Plats B & C Reconciliation Total 
Orton's Signed Change Orders for Plat B 
Orton's Unsigned Change Orders for Plat B 
Orton's Unsigned Change Orders for Plat C 
Mountainland Invoices Not Chargeable to Orton 
Mountainland Finance Charges Not Chargeable to Orton 
Interest 
I Attorney's Fees | 
1 TOTAL DUE TO ORTON: [ 
] 8,916.11 | 
| 21,907.85 J 
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74 Nibco Boiler Drain 
Clierne Test 3 
CL350 Ductile Pipe 
CL350 Ductile Pipe 
CL350 Ductile Pipe 
CL350 Ductile Pipe 
CI ,350 Ductile Pipe 1 
Type K. Soft Copper 
10" PVC Sewer Wye 
Customer Order - Personal 
Customer Order - Plat C-2 Job 
Type K. Soft Copper 
4" PVC Sewer Pipe 
10" PVC Sewer Pipe 
10" PVC Sewer Pipe 
8" Ductile Pipe 
1 8" Gate Valve 
1 10" PVC Sewer Pipe 

























Needs explanation. II 
Needs explanation. 
Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25 
Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25 
Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25 
Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25 
Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25 | 
Bid at $1.23-Charged $4.17 
Bid at $3.44-Charged $3.55 | 
Not used by Orton Excavation 
Not used by Orton Excavation 
1 Bid at $1.23-Charged $1.48 | 
Bid at $.65 - Charged $.68 
Bid at $3.44 - Charged $3.74 
Bid at $3.44 - Charged $3.74 
Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25 
Bid at $300.00 - Charged 
$314.00 
Bid at $3.44 - Charged $3.74 
Bid at $300.00 - Charged at 
$314.00 
CO 
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MOUNTAINLAND SUPPLY CO. 
Finance Charge Itemization 
RIDERWOOD VILLAGE 
|| June 30.1994 
July 31,1994 
1 August 31,1994 
J September 30, 1994 
|| October 31, 1994 
1 November 30, 1994 
1 December 31. 1994 
| January 31, 1995 
1 February 28, 1995 
] March 31, 1995 
April 30, 1995 | 
1 May 31,1995 1 
June 30.1995 
July 31,1995 
1 August 31, 1995 
| _ September 30. 1995 | 
1 TOTAL: 1 
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BRADFORD, BRADY & JOHNSON, L.C. 
389 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 432 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Richard D. Bradford Telephone: (801) 374-6272 
M. James Brady Facsimile: (801) 374-6282 
S. Austin Johnson 
James E. Bean 
June 11, 1997 
Mark E. Arnold 
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
American Plaza n, Suite 404 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: Pacific Development v. Eric Orton 
Dear Mark: 
In anticipation of our meeting on June 23,1 am writing to clarify my current understanding 
as to various issues, to render an accounting as to the amounts owed, and to provide you with our 
settlement position. 
According to our discussions and agreements, the Plaintiffs are dropping their claims relating 
to the defamation causes of action. 
We have also established that Plat B was essentially at a break even, and the only real factual 
disputes are on Plat C. I understand that to mean that the signed and unsigned change orders on Plat 
B are no longer contested, and that the only contested issues relate to the unsigned change orders or 
additions on Plat C. 
We also in agreement, on the issue of the change orders, as stated by Otto Belvedere in Part 
2 of his deposition, that any work ordered or authorized by Otto, John, or anyone else in authority 
on the project, would be paid regardless of whether a change order was prepared or signed. 
We provided to you earlier an explanation regarding the thirteen (13) change orders on Plat 
C, and you responded with Mr. Belvedere's corresponding explanations. 
In preparation for our meeting that was scheduled many weeks ago, my paralegal and I did 
a more thorough review of the accounting. A summary of the accounting follows. Backup 
documentation is available for each of these items. 
Mark E. Arnold 
June 11, 1997 
Page 2 
To ensure fairness, and to simplify the accounting as much as possible, I have taken as the 
starting point Otto Belvedere's own accounting reconciliations. According to Dave Schiess, Otto's 
Accountant, his express instructions were to prepare these reconciliations on the base contract only 
and without regard to any changes, extras or additions. In any event, Dave's accounting does not 
deal with any of the excavation extras, as no excavation was contemplated by the contracts. 
The combined reconciliation of Plat B and Plat C shows that Otto acknowledges owing Orton 
Excavation $8,916.11 prior to consideration of any change orders. 
At one point, Otto claimed to have overpaid Orton Excavation on Plat "B" by $46,771.90. 
However, when all of the extras on Plat "B" are included (signed change orders = $21,907.85; 
unsigned change orders = $24,600.67; total= $46,508.52), those come to within $263.38 of the 
$46,771.90 that Belvedere claims to have overpaid. By agreeing to those extras and changes on 
Plat "B," that eliminates any remaining disputes on Plat "B." 
The change orders from Plat C add an additional $65,263.98. This brings the total so far to 
$120,688.61. 
In the process of reviewing the accounting, we also discovered a number of items that were 
included in the Mountainland credit against Orton Excavation which were improperly credited. They 
were either not used on the job at all, or were not used in connection with Orton Excavation's 
portion of the contract. These are further detailed in the attached spread sheet, and I have backup 
documentation regarding each of these credits that we claim have been improperly taken. You may 
want to review each of those individually when we meet. This adds an additional $1,945.04. 
We also noted that the amounts paid to Mountainland included finance charges. Since the 
agreement was that Pacific Development would pay the Mountainland invoices directly, any delay 
in paying those bills, resulting in service charges, should not be charged against Orton Excavation. 
We therefore add those back in the amount of $9,922.50. 
This brings us to a total principal balance, prior to the addition of interest or attorney's fees 
to $132,556.15. 
As to the calculation of interest, it is a very complex matter to calculate the interest on each 
invoice from the due date forward. It is further complicated by the timing of the sequence of all the 
payments. Therefore, in order to simplify the calculation of interest and to give Pacific Development 
a break, I have calculated interest at the legal rate, beginning thirty (30) days after completion of all 
work. This figure therefore includes no interest for the first year and a half of the project. This 
interest calculation is slanted very much in Otto's favor. 
Calculating interest at the legal rate of 10%, the interest amounts to $27,128.61. 
Attorney fees, as provided by statute as well as by contract, together with costs to date, 
amounts to 521,652.46. 
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Mark E. Arnold 
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Page 3 
For your convenience, I present the following summary of the accounting of the various 
claims: 
Description 
Taking Pacific Development's own reconciliation of 
Plats "B" and UC" at face value, which acknowledges an 
amount owing, prior to any changes or additions, of 
Adding in the agreed change orders on Plat UB" in the 
amount of 
Adding in Orton's claim on the change orders on Plat 
" C in the amount of 
And then adding back in the Mountainland invoices 
wrongfully charged against Orton Excavation in the 
amount of 
And the service charges in the amount of 
Add interest as provided by statute at the rate of 10% 
per annum from June 15, 1995 to April 28, 1997, which 
amounts to 
Add in the amount to date in attorney's fees and costs 
Orton Excavation's total claim is 
Amount 

















There are other damages which my client considers to be significant, including lost 
opportunity costs, loss of equity, and loss of utility in his equipment when it was repossessed. 
Eric claims that his inability to make his equipment payments was directly related to Mr. 
Belvedere's failure to make payments as promised. 
Backup documentation is in the materials were received from Mr. Belvedere, so the 
information is already in his files. Our accounting is simply taken from those documents. 
However, if you wish to view my documents and summarjes4or convenience, we will have an 
opportunity to share those materials in our meeting on^June 23 y 
Very truly y ^ s , ^ - ^
 r 
/ Attohie^at Law ^ C/ 
RDB:dvc 
